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INTERNATIONAL

South A frica
From C onfrontation
to Cooperation
24

At the beginning of the 1980s, however,
South Africa initiated a more aggressive
policy toward Mozambique and other neigh
boring states by unleashing air and ground
strikes against suspected ANC targets.1
This change in strategy came about as
a result of: (1) growing ANC sabotage ac
tivities inside South Africa; (2) the end of
white rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); and (3)
a change of leadership in the U.S.
On January 30, 1981, only 10 days after
the presidential inauguration of Ronald
Reagan, South African commandos struck

By M o h a m e d E l-K h a w a s
(S e c o n d o f tw o p a rts )

n the 1990s, South Africa appears to be
inching closer to an era of peaceful co
existence with its neighbors. There
are signs that it is shifting from confronta
tion to cooperation, particularly with
Angola and Mozambique.
The first of this two-part series dealt with
South Africa and Angola; the second focus
es on Mozambique.

I

South Africa and Mozambique
Initially, South Africa pursued two different
policies toward Mozambique and Angola.
It objected to the Movimento Popular de
Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) coming to
power in Angola, but did not oppose the
ascendance to power in 1975 of the
Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
(FRELIMO) in Mozambique. It knew that
FRELIMO, out of economic necessity,
would pursue a pragmatic policy. In fact,
up until 1980, South Africa maintained
economic ties with Mozambique even
though the two countries had no formal
diplomatic relations.
Mozambique has long been dependent
on South Africa for economic survival, hav
ing inherited from the Portuguese an
economy that was closely linked with South
Africa. Mozambique provides transit facil
ities for South African goods; sells electri
city to Pretoria from the Cahora Bassa
Dam; provides workers for South African
mines. For years, these transactions have
helped Mozambique ease its shortages in
foreign exchange earnings.
Although Mozambique’s government,
under Samora Machel, continued to deal
with South Africa on economic matters, it
remained committed to majority rule in
South Africa, and to its support for the
African National Congress (ANC) by occa
sionally allowing ANC fighters to cross its
borders and carry out armed attacks inside
South Africa.

Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
NEW DIRECTIONS SUMMER 1990

inside Mozambique for the first time. They
raided ANC residences in Matola, a suburb
of Maputo, the capital city, killing 13 peo
ple and kidnapping 3 others.2 This action
marked the start of repeated military in
cursions by South African forces into Mo
zambique and neighboring countries. In the
following years, Pretoria intensified its
policy of swift retribution,-after ANC
fighters attacked government buildings in
side South Africa, causing heavy casualties.
On May 23, 1983, South Africa’s Air
Force was used for the first time to attack
ANC offices in Maputo, killing 5 and wound
ing 40. This air raid was a reprisal for a carbomb explosion in Pretoria three days
earlier, which killed 18 people and wound
ed 190.3
South Africa’s repeated military actions
inside Mozambique were intended to pres
sure the government of Samora Machel to
cease its assistance to the ANC. Also,

South Africa resolved to escalate its desta
bilization campaign by providing a safe
haven inside South Africa for the right-wing
insurgent group, Mozambique National
Resistance (RENAMO), which had been
expelled from Zimbabwe in 1980. To this
day, RENAMO is waging a guerrilla war to
oust the government in Mozambique, with
the help of South Africa, which has sup
plied the group with training, weapons, and
logistical support along the Indian Ocean
coastline.
While South Africa did not initially an
nounce its support of RENAMO publicly,
Mozambican officials have said all along that
there was clear evidence of such support.
In December 1981, for example, docu
ments were found in a RENAMO camp that
reported on meetings between its leader,
Afonso Dhlakama, and South African offi
cials a year earlier. In one of the documents,
a South African officer is quoted as saying,
“ instructors who go into Mozambique will
not only teach, but also participate in
attacks.’’4
South Africa also provided RENAMO
with broadcasting facilities to help it spread
anti-government propaganda in Mozam
bique, through The Voice of the Mozam
bique National Resistance, which went on
the air inside South Africa during the early
1980s.
Pretoria’s assistance to RENAMO, as
noted earlier, was intended to put pressure
on the Machel government to disavow the
ANC. And the longer Machel continued
supporting the ANC, the bigger the
RENAMO campaign became. By 1983,
RENAMO was active in 7 out of the 10
provinces in Mozambique. Its subversive
campaigns succeeded in disrupting the
economy, which was already hard hit by a
severe drought.
According to official estimates, there
were approximately 1,000,000 displaced
persons in Mozambique in 1986, all forced
to abandon their farms and flee their homes
in the face of RENAMO attacks on their
villages. In addition, 300,000 others had fled
to South Africa and Zimbabwe.
The dislocation of so many people has
had an adverse impact on agriculture, caus
ing severe grain shortages and forcing the
government to rely heavily on foreign aid
to m eet the country’s food needs. This
situation exacerbated problems caused by
the 1981-1984 drought, during which about
100,000 people died of hunger in Mozam
bique. Subsequent flooding washed out
roads and bridges, adding further barriers
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to em ergency deliveries of food and
medicine.
After the drought emergency, in 1986, it
was estimated that about 2,000,000 peo
ple were threatened by further starvation
because “ rebel attacks combined to
strangle food production and hinder an in
ternational relief effort.” 5
To make it more difficult for the Machel
government to cope with its ailing economy,
South Africa also put economic pressures
on Mozambique. First, the number of
Mozambicans working in South African
mines dropped sharply, from 120,000 prior
to 1975 to only 40,000 in 1983. Their earn
ings had helped ease Mozambique’s foreign
exchange problems. Second, South Africa
reduced its use of Mozambique’s transit
facilities, dropping from 6,000,000 tons of
exports in 1973 to only 2,000,000 tons in
1982.6 Third, it cut its utilization of elec
tricity from the Cahora Bassa Dam. These
measures caused a sizeable decline in
Mozambique’s foreign exchange earnings
and contributed to the worsening of its
already bleak economic situation.
South Africa’s destabilization campaign
thus made it costly for the Machel govern
ment to continue support for the ANC.
Pretoria had used a “ big stick” to let
Mozambican officials know that they could
not resolve their domestic problems with
out first dealing with the South African de
mand to bring cross-border raids to an end.
The same message was echoed by the
U.S., but with hints of help in pulling
Mozambique out of its economic dif
ficulties. In June 1983, Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. undersecretary of state, said
in San Francisco that the Reagan adminis
tration was pressing ‘‘for dialogue between
South Africa and Mozambique, and an end
to cross-border violence.” 7
The Nkomati Accord
In the fall of 1983, Machel laid the ground
work for rapprochement with South Africa.
He began to scale down his dependence on
the Soviet bloc and to move closer to the
West, with a visit, in October 1983, to
Europe to attract “ massive and immediate
Western investment and aid.” 8 He also
sought to convince Portugal and Britain to
give his country military assistance, espe
cially in the area of counterinsurgency
training.
While Machel was touring Europe, South
African commandos blew up several ANC
houses near the presidential residence in
Maputo. And South African Defense Min

http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol17/iss3/6

ister Magnus Malan asserted that the
attacks were in retaliation for the damag
ing of oil storage facilities the week before
in W armbaths, N orthern Transvaal.9
Malan blamed the Mozambican govern
m ent for its failure to heed repeated
demands by South Africa ‘ ‘to get rid of the
ANC.” He also warned that “ as long as
they continue to help the ANC with the
planning of terrorist acts and continue to
harbor and provide facilities to the ANC,
the South African Defense Force will con
duct operations in that country.” 10

South Africa provided
RENAMO with broad
casting facilities to help it
spread anti-government
propaganda in
M ozam bique...

South Africa’s attacks in Maputo dem
onstrated Mozambique’s vulnerability to
military intervention. Mozambique was de
fenseless; it was unable to stop South
Africa’s incursions. And, following the Oc
tober 1983 raid, Malan pointed out that ‘ ‘it
was but a small taste of what was to come
if neighboring states continued to harbor
terrorists.’’ He warned that “ South Africa
has not yet wielded its ‘iron fist’ but its pa
tience is wearing thin.” 11
Under these circumstances, Machel had
no other choice but to deal directly with
Pretoria and get South Africa to end its
military attacks and its backing of the
Mozambican rebels. Both the U.S. and Por
tugal played key roles in getting Pretoria
and Maputo to discuss security and eco
nomic matters. Finally, in March 1984, the
Nkomati Accord was signed, ending years
of hostility between the two countries. Both
co u n trie s prom ised to discontinue

assistance to insurgent groups. In addition,
South Africa was to increase trade and
tourism and offer economic assistance to
Mozambique.
The Machel government kept its part of
the deal by taking steps to halt ANC activi
ties in Mozambique. Police raided ANC
buildings in Maputo and confiscated wea
pons. In addition, hundreds of South Afri
can refugees were ordered to leave the
country.12 These m easures drew sharp
criticism from ANC leaders, who voiced
their determination to continue their armed
struggle.
But South Africa did not fulfill its obliga
tions under the Nkomati pact. In particular,
it continued to provide covert aid to the
Mozambican insurgency. Diaries of a
RENAMO field commander captured in
August 1985 revealed that the South African
military agreed to stockpile weapons for
RENAMO just before the Nkomati pact
was signed. Further, Colonel Cornelius
(Charles) van Niekerk, South African
military liaison to RENAMO, worked out
plans to continue to train RENAMO forces
inside South Africa and to supply them with
ammunition for their sabotage campaigns
in Mozambique. He even urged RENAMO
leaders to turn down Machel’s amnesty
offer that was made in accordance with its
agreem ent with P retoria. And after
RENAMO’s main headquarters were
moved out of South Africa to neighboring
Malawi, South African diplomats in Malawi
continued to assist RENAMO and coor
dinate their country’s covert assistance.13
In September 1985, in response to these
revelations, the Machel government sus
pended its participation in the joint com
mission set up under the Nkomati pact.14
Mozambican officials were disappointed
with Pretoria’s failure to cease all support
for RENAMO and were having second
thoughts about the pact. There was grow
ing opposition to the Nkomati pact in
Maputo’s ruling circles because the contin
uing flow of South African arms and sup
plies had enabled RENAMO to expand its
activities. Under these circumstances,
Mozambique resolved to quietly discard the
non-aggression pact with South Africa.
Mozambique was also critical of the U.S.
role due to the fact that the U.S. neither
pressured South Africa to honor the pact
nor increased its economic assistance and
investment in Mozambique. The Reagan
adm inistration gave Mozambique $73
million in foodstuffs between 1983 and 1985,
but was unable to provide more economic
NEW DIRECTIONS SUMMER 1990
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development assistance because of opposi
tion in Congress to the Marxist regime in
Maputo.The Gramm- Rudman legislation
led to further reductions in the economic
aid package, which amounted to $9.5 million
in 1986, about $3.5 million less than the year
before. Nor was there any prospect for a
substantial increase in American corporate
inv estm en t b ecau se of R ENAM O’s
destabilizing military campaign throughout
the country.15
The Machel government also found that
the Western powers could not m eet all of
its military needs to fight the insurgency.
The U.S. Congress rejected the Reagan ad
ministration’s request for $4.6 million in
nonlethal military aid for Mozambique over
two years. And Britain provided only a mod
est training program for the Mozambican
military, while Portugal did not respond to
requests for military supplies and training
in counterinsurgency.16
In view of these developments, Machel
concluded that the West could not help his
country pull out of its economic and secur
ity problems. In April 1986, he traveled to
Moscow to seek more Soviet aid. He was
seeking a military solution, with the help
of Zimbabwe, which had been affected by
RENAMO’s sabotage of Mozambique’s
harbors and transit facilities.
As another line of defense, the Mozam
bican government took steps to deny
RENAMO the use of Malawi as a sanctuary
and a supply base. In September 1986, a
regional summit was held in Blantyre,
Malawi’s capital, during which Machel,
along with Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and
Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, urged Malawi’s
Hastings Kamuzu Banda to hand the
RENAMO rebels over to Mozambican au
thorities. Banda refused; instead, he prom
ised to expel the rebels from his country.
When Banda was slow in fulfilling his
pledge, the Mozambican governm ent
threatened to blockade Malawi.17
On October 6, 1986, six South African
soldiers were wounded by a land mine just
inside the border with Mozambique. This
incident marked the resumption of the
ANC’s activities from Mozambique. In
response, Pretoria retaliated by banning
further hiring of Mozambicans wishing to
work in South Africa. Further, it informed
the M achel governm ent that 68,665
Mozambicans already working in South
African mines would return home upon the
expiration of their contracts.18
South Africa said the action was taken
“ as a result of the activities of the ANC
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and the South African Communist Party,
who are responsible for the continuing
deteriorating security situation on the com
mon border... and who, according to infor
mation in possession of [the government],
as confirmed by recent incidents, is still
operating from Mozambique.’’19
Thus, the Nkomati Accord of 1984 was
decisively put to rest—a situation that led
to a renewed South African destabilization
campaign in Mozambique.
On October 11, 1986 Mozambican of
ficials accused Pretoria of massing troops
along their border and of sending comman
do units “ to carry out acts of terrorism ’’
in their country. The following day, leaders
of the frontline states held a summit in
Maputo and accused Pretoria of ‘‘preparing
for war.’’ They called on “ all the peoples
and governments of the world to block
South Africa’s race toward generalized
war.” 20
On October 19,1986, Machel, along with
33 other Mozambican officials, died in a
suspicious plane crash near Mbuzini, in
South Africa, while on a flight home from
Lusaka, Zambia. This incident took place
just a week after the South African defense
minister had predicted that the Machel gov
ernment was ‘‘about to collapse’’ because
of the ailing economy and RENAMO’s suc
cessful insurgency.21 It is in this context
that some African leaders, and others
wondered whether Pretoria had something
to do with Machel’s death.
After Machel, Joachim Chissano became
the president of Mozambique during a most
difficult period in its history. Since taking
power in 1986, he has dealt with serious
domestic problems resulting from RE
NAMO’s stepped-up sabotage campaign
and Pretoria’s attacks on suspected ANC
quarters in Maputo. Chissano’s pragmatism
has led him to try again to move closer to
the West, to reduce his country’s depend
ence on the Soviet Union, and to mend
fences with South Africa. His diplomatic in
itiative was a success for the following
reasons:
□ First, the new detente between Mos
cow and Washington has led the super
powers to become actively involved in
the search for political solutions for the
Southern African region.
□ Second, the Kremlin, under Mikhail
Gorbachev’s leadership, has lost inter
est in pouring millions of dollars of
scarce resources into a distant military
entanglement.

□ Third, the economic sanctions against
South Africa and the high cost of its
military campaigns in Mozambique and
other neighboring countries have led
the South African government to try
to break out of isolation through a
policy of communication rather than
confrontation.
These developments have made it easier
for Chissano to attract Western economic
assistance, especially since he has con
tinued to eliminate some of the socialist
elements in the Mozambican economy, and
to receive loans from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
In September 1988, Chissano, with the
help of Britain, held a summit with South
Africa’s Botha in Songo, Mozambique.
These talks resulted in reviving the 1984
Nkomati Accord. Botha pledged to discon
tinue support to RENAMO, to provide
technical and security assistance, and to
“ rebuild power lines from the Cahora
Bassa hydro-electric power project that
were destroyed by RENAMO.” 22 He also
promised “ substantial financial aid to
Mozambique.” 23
The change in government in South
Africa in 1989 did not result in any change
in policy toward Mozambique. President
Frederik W. de Klerk continued to work for
the improvement of relations with Mozam
bique. In December 1989, he met with
Chissano in Maputo and announced that his
government ‘‘does not aid RENAMO in any
way
w hatever.” 24
However,
he
acknowledged that some South Africans
are still sending equipment and funds to
RENAMO. This fact meant that some
South Africans, probably including the
military or intelligence personnel, have
maintained their leverage for destabilizing
Mozambique. Under these circumstances,
Chissano called upon Pretoria to ‘‘increase
its efforts” to halt the flow of arms and
money to RENAMO across the border.25
In Maputo, de Klerk also discussed
Chissano’s efforts aimed at ending the civil
war in Mozambique. Last July, the South
African leader had already endorsed these
initiatives and had called on RENAMO to
agree to a cease-fire and to help rebuuild
the economy of the war-torn country.26
Chissano’s peace initiatives were also
backed by the Bush adm inistration.
Herman Cohen, assistant secretary of state
for African affairs, travelled to the region
in July 1989 to explore ‘‘the possibilities for
fostering peace in Mozambique.” 27
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Search for Peace
Chissano suddenly shifted his policy in
mid-1989, favoring a negotiated settlement
for the civil war, which neither side could
win in the battlefield. The reasons for his
shift were:
□ First, the South African government
has ceased its support for RENAMO
and has begun to cooperate with
Mozambique.
□ Second, the Soviet Union, Mozam
bique’s main arms supplier, decided
to begin pulling its military advisors
out of Mozambique over 18 months
and to reduce its military assistance
by 40 percent.
□ Third, Zimbabwe, which has had
troops defending key transportation
routes in Mozambique, pressured the
Chissano government for talks with
RENAMO.
□ Fourth, the climate in Southern Africa
encouraged talks among adversaries,
especially after a settlem en t in
Namibia was reached and a cease-fire
took hold in Angola.
Chissano hoped that the Angolan model
could be used to end the fighting in his coun
try. He called upon RENAMO “ to follow
suit’’ and sought the backing of the United
Nations to sta rt a dialogue with the
rebels.28
RENAMO, on the other hand, insisted
that “ any cease-fire has to be mutual, not
unilateral’’ as Chissano proposed. Luis
Serapiao, RENAMO’s representative in
Washington and professor at Howard
University, stated:
Talks have to be among equal partners
without preconditions. The govern
ment is offering [a] dialogue about
ending the fighting and potentially
about the conditions of amnesty for
RENAMO members. But it is not
willing to agree to power-sharing
negotiations.29
In October 1989, Afonso Dhlakama re
jected direct talks with the Mozambican
government because his movement does
“ not recognize it as a sovereign state.’’ He
instead “ wanted to speak, not to the
government, but to the FRELIMO Par
ty.’’30 As a result, a stalemate continued.
Thus, the peace process, which was in
itiated by officials of Mozambique’s Catholic
and Anglican churches, was deadlocked
because the rebels had declined to accept
Chissano’s offer to end violence and
recognize the co untry’s constitution.
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RENAMO’s officials have demanded that a
constituent assembly be elected and a
multiparty system be created.31
To break the stalemate, Kenya’s Daniel
arap Moi and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe,
who accepted the role of mediators, sought
to find a formula that would bring the two
factions together for direct talks on a political
solution for the internal conflict in
Mozambique.
Meanwhile, Chisssano, in an attempt to
induce RENAMO to start a dialogue, has
continued the reforms to liberalize the coun
try’s economy and, in January 1990, outlined
a new draft constitution aimed at address
ing some of the criticism expressed by
RENAMO and other Mozambicans. He pro
posed that the president be elected by
universal suffrage and secret ballot. Two or
more candidates will run for the president’s
office. Also, there will be direct elections
for members of parliament. National elec
tions can be held in 1991.32
These reforms were not sufficient to lure
RENAMO to the negotiating table, however.
To break the stalemate, Moi and Mugabe
suggested that the Mozambican government
and RENAMO should agree to unconditional
talks. In addition, Malawi’s Hastings Banda
urged RENAMO to start direct talks in his
capital on June 12, 1990. But this meeting
never took place. It was not until July 8,1990
that direct talks between the Mozambican
government and RENAMO took place in
Rome. It is noteworthy that neither Kenya
nor Zimbabwe attended the Rome meeting.
At the end of the three-day meeting, the
parties agreed to meet again in Rome to
seek ‘‘a platform for work that will bring the
war to an end and create poliltical, economic
and social conditions that will bring lasting
peace and normalization of life to all Mozam
bican citizens.” 34
It is too early to tell whether direct talks
will lead to a peaceful solution to the bloody
civil war in Mozambique. It is now up to the
Chissano governm ent and RENAMO
leaders to find ways to end the conflict,
rebuild the country and develop its economy.
The peace initiatives have a good chance
to succeed because of the end of the cold
war and the backing of the front-line states,
as well as South Africa, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. In the final analysis, however,
Mozambican leaders have the ultimate
responsibility for the success or failure of
the peace negotiations. □
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